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Product Compatibility as an Strategy to Hinder Entry Deterrence

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dc.contributor.gruplacFacultad de Economía spa
dc.creatorRoig Roig, Guillem
dc.date.accessioned2017-10-11T16:53:41Z
dc.date.available2017-10-11T16:53:41Z
dc.date.created2017-10-19
dc.date.issued2017
dc.description.abstractIn many markets, firms produce and sell complementary components that form a product system. This paper studies the effects of compatibility in product advertisement and entry decisions in a differentiated product market. While advertising enhances the ability of consumers to mix and match components closer to their preferences, more advertising does not always generate larger welfare. In my model, an incumbent uses advertising to increase the prospects of market competition with the objective to deter potential entry. However, under some parameters, entry deterrence does not occur when products are made compatible. With compatible products, the incumbent either obtains large benefits from accommodation or equilibria when all consumers are aware of the existence of the available products emerge. In this latter case, the amount of advertising cannot be further expanded to protect the incumbent's monopolistic position. As a result, policies in favor of compatibility may encourage entry and generate larger levels of advertisement.eng
dc.format.extent45spa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_13810
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/13810
dc.language.isospa
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 205
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/015774.html
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBagwell, K. and G. Ramey, 1987, Advertising and limit pricing, The Rand Journal of Economics. 19 59-71.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBagwell, K. 2007. The economic analysis of advertising. Handbook of Industrial Organization. Vol. 3, Chapter 28
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBain, J. 1956 Barriers to New Competition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBaldani, J. P. and and R. Masson. 1981. Economies of Scale, Strategic Advertising and Fully Credible Entry Deterrence. Mimeographed. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationButters, G. 1977. Equilibrium distribution of sales and advertising prices. Review of Economic Studies 44(3) 465-491.
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.subjectCompatibilidad del productospa
dc.subjectPublicidad informativaspa
dc.subjectDisuasión de entradaspa
dc.subjectEstructura del mercadospa
dc.subject.ddcAdministración general
dc.subject.jelD21
dc.subject.jelD43
dc.subject.jelL13
dc.subject.jelL15
dc.subject.keywordProduct compatibilityeng
dc.subject.keywordInformative advertisingeng
dc.subject.keywordEntry deterrenceeng
dc.subject.keywordMarket structureeng
dc.subject.lembComportamiento organizacionalspa
dc.subject.lembDesarrollo de nuevos productosspa
dc.subject.lembAnálisis de mercadeospa
dc.subject.lembCampañas publicitariasspa
dc.subject.lembCompetencia económicaspa
dc.subject.lembModelos econométricosspa
dc.titleProduct Compatibility as an Strategy to Hinder Entry Deterrencespa
dc.typeworkingPapereng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajospa
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