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Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It’s a matter of timing

dc.contributor.gruplacGrupo de Investigaciones. Facultad de Economía. Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.creatorAycinena Abascal, Diego
dc.creatorElbittar, Alexander
dc.creatorGomberg, Andrei
dc.creatorRentschler, Lucas
dc.descriptionLa sabiduría convencional sugiere que prometerle a un agente información gratuita desplazaría la costosa adquisición de información. Demostramos teóricamente que esta intuición solo se sostiene como un caso filo de cuchillo donde los priores son simétricos. Para los antecedentes asimétricos, se predice que los agentes aumentarán su adquisición de información cuando se les prometa información gratuita en el futuro. Probamos en el laboratorio si tal desplazamiento ocurre tanto para los anteriores simétricos como asimétricos. Encontramos apoyo teórico para las predicciones: cuando los antecedentes son asimétricos, la promesa de información "gratuita" en el futuro induce a los sujetos a adquirir información costosa que de otra manera no estarían adquiriendo.spa
dc.description.abstractConventional wisdom suggests that promising an agent free information would crowd out costly information acquisition. We theoretically demonstrate that this intuition only holds as a knife-edge case where priors are symmetric. For asymmetric priors, agents are predicted to increase their information acquisition when promised free information in the future. We test in the lab whether such crowding out occurs for both symmetric and asymmetric priors. We find theoretical support for the predictions: when priors are asymmetric, the promise of future “free” information induces subjects to acquire costly information which they would not be acquiring otherwise.spa
dc.format.extent33 pp.spa
dc.identifier.citationAycinena, Diego; Elbittar, Alexander; Gomberg, Andrei; Rentschler, Lucas (2020) Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It’s a matter of timing. Universidad del Rosario, Department of Economics, Documentos de trabajo economía. 33 pp.spa
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 2.5 Colombiaspa
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
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dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subjectAdquisición de informaciónspa
dc.subjectIgnorancia racionalspa
dc.subject.keywordInformation acquisitionspa
dc.subject.keywordRational ignorancespa
dc.titleDoes free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It’s a matter of timingspa
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajospa
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