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School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms

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dc.creatorJaramillo, Paula
dc.creatorKayi, Cagatay
dc.creatorKlijn, Flip
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-04T16:33:14Z
dc.date.available2017-04-04T16:33:14Z
dc.date.created2017
dc.date.issued2017
dc.description.abstractWe consider school choice problems (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003) where students are assigned to public schools through a centralized assignment mechanism. We study the family of so-called rank-priority mechanisms, each of which is induced by an order of rank-priority pairs. Following the corresponding order of pairs, at each step a rank-priority mechanism considers a rank-priority pair and matches an available student to an unfilled school if the student and the school rank and prioritize each other in accordance with the rank-priority pair. The Boston or immediate acceptance mechanism is a particular rank-priority mechanism. Our first main result is a characterization of the subfamily of rank-priority mechanisms that Nash implement the set of stable (i.e., fair) matchings (Theorem 1). We show that our characterization also holds for "sub-implementation" and "sup-implementation" (Corollaries 3 and 4). Our second main result is a strong impossibility result: under incomplete information, no rank-priority mechanism implements the set of stable matchings (Theorem 2).eng
dc.format.extent29spa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.tipoDocumentospa
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_13235
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co//handle/10336/13235
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosariospa
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economíaspa
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/015501.html
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)spa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subject.ddcProbabilidades & matemáticas aplicadas
dc.subject.jelC78
dc.subject.jelD61
dc.subject.jelD78
dc.subject.jelI20
dc.subject.keywordNash implementationeng
dc.subject.keywordSchool choiceeng
dc.subject.keywordRank-priority mechanismseng
dc.subject.keywordStabilityeng
dc.subject.lembTeoría de los juegosspa
dc.subject.lembEquilibrio (Economía)spa
dc.titleSchool Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanismsspa
dc.typeworkingPapereng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajospa
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