Ítem
Acceso Abierto

Distinguisher-based attacks on public-key cryptosystems using Reed-Solomon codes

Mostrar el registro sencillo de la publicación
dc.creatorCouvreur, Alainspa
dc.creatorGaborit, Philippespa
dc.creatorGauthier-Umaña, Valériespa
dc.creatorOtmani, Ayoubspa
dc.creatorTillich, Jean-Pierrespa
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-26T00:05:58Z
dc.date.available2020-05-26T00:05:58Z
dc.date.created2014spa
dc.description.abstractBecause of their interesting algebraic properties, several authors promote the use of generalized Reed-Solomon codes in cryptography. Niederreiter was the first to suggest an instantiation of his cryptosystem with them but Sidelnikov and Shestakov showed that this choice is insecure. Wieschebrink proposed a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem which consists in concatenating a few random columns to a generator matrix of a secretly chosen generalized Reed-Solomon code. More recently, new schemes appeared which are the homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Bogdanov and Lee, and a variation of the McEliece cryptosystem proposed by Baldi et al. which hides the generalized Reed-Solomon code by means of matrices of very low rank. In this work, we show how to mount key-recovery attacks against these public-key encryption schemes. We use the concept of distinguisher which aims at detecting a behavior different from the one that one would expect from a random code. All the distinguishers we have built are based on the notion of component-wise product of codes. It results in a powerful tool that is able to recover the secret structure of codes when they are derived from generalized Reed-Solomon codes. Lastly, we give an alternative to Sidelnikov and Shestakov attack by building a filtration which enables to completely recover the support and the non-zero scalars defining the secret generalized Reed-Solomon code. © 2014 Springer Science+Business Media New York.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10623-014-9967-z
dc.identifier.issn09251022
dc.identifier.issn15737586
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23845
dc.language.isoengspa
dc.publisherKluwer Academic Publishersspa
dc.relation.citationEndPage666
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 2
dc.relation.citationStartPage641
dc.relation.citationTitleDesigns, Codes, and Cryptography
dc.relation.citationVolumeVol. 73
dc.relation.ispartofDesigns, Codes, and Cryptography, ISSN:09251022, 15737586, Vol.73, No.2 (2014); pp. 641-666spa
dc.relation.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84905217777&doi=10.1007%2fs10623-014-9967-z&partnerID=40&md5=2d3741ccd9d58ebce49f8a5319179270spa
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subject.keywordMatrix algebraspa
dc.subject.keywordPublic key cryptographyspa
dc.subject.keywordRecoveryspa
dc.subject.keywordReed-Solomon codesspa
dc.subject.keywordCode-based cryptographyspa
dc.subject.keywordDistinguishersspa
dc.subject.keywordGeneralized reed-solomon codesspa
dc.subject.keywordHo-momorphic encryptionsspa
dc.subject.keywordKey-recoveryspa
dc.subject.keywordCodes (symbols)spa
dc.subject.keywordCode-based cryptographyspa
dc.subject.keywordDistinguisherspa
dc.subject.keywordGeneralized Reed-Solomon codesspa
dc.subject.keywordHomomorphic encryptionspa
dc.subject.keywordKey-recoveryspa
dc.titleDistinguisher-based attacks on public-key cryptosystems using Reed-Solomon codesspa
dc.typearticleeng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spaArtículospa
Archivos
Bloque original
Mostrando1 - 1 de 1
Miniatura
Nombre:
10-1-1-402-9436.pdf
Tamaño:
420.86 KB
Formato:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Descripción:
Descargar
Colecciones
Artículos