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The value of cooperative investment in nonexclusive contracts

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dc.contributor.gruplacGrupo de Investigaciones. Facultad de Economía. Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.creatorRoig Roig, Guillem
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-19T21:33:45Z
dc.date.available2020-06-19T21:33:45Z
dc.date.created2020-06-01
dc.date.issued2020-06-18
dc.descriptionEste artículo examina los incentivos para que un comprador realice una inversión específica de la relación en presencia de múltiples proveedores que brindan un aporte homogéneo. Cuando varios proveedores compiten por un solo comprador, la inversión del comprador afecta su opción externa en caso de ruptura de la relación. La inversión específica de la relación con un proveedor reduce así la opción externa del comprador, en caso de que se produzca un desglose de la oferta con este proveedor, pero aumenta la opción externa del comprador con respecto a un desglose de la oferta de los proveedores competidores. La medida en que los proveedores ofrecen contratos comerciales diseñados para sustituir la pérdida comercial de un desglose de la relación, por lo tanto, da forma a los cambios en la opción externa del comprador y sus incentivos para invertir. El presente documento muestra que la introducción de la competencia a un lado del mercado reduce el problema de atraso asociado con la inversión específica de la relación y establece condiciones en las que la inversión no se materializa.spa
dc.description.abstractThis article examines the incentives for a buyer to undertake relationship-specific investment in the presence of multiple suppliers who provide a homogeneous input. When multiple suppliers compete for a single buyer, the buyer's investment affects its outside option in the event of a relationship breakdown. Relationship-specific investment with a supplier thus reduces the buyer's outside option, were there to be a supply breakdown with this supplier, but increases the buyer's outside option with respect to a supply breakdown of competing suppliers. The extent to which suppliers offer trading contracts designed to substitute the trade loss from a relationship breakdown, therefore shapes the changes in the buyer's outside option and its incentives to invest. The present paper shows that introducing competition to one side of the market reduces the hold-up problem associated with relationship-specific investment and establishes conditions where investment does not materialize.spa
dc.format.extent31spa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationRoig, Guillem (2020) The value of cooperative investment in nonexclusive contracts. Bogota : Universidad del Rosario, Department of Economics, Bogota. Documentos de trabajo economía. 21 pp.spa
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_25237
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/25237
dc.language.isospa
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/018208.html
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
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dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subjectInversión especificaspa
dc.subjectOpción exteriorspa
dc.subjectDesglose de relaciónspa
dc.subject.ddcEconomíaspa
dc.subject.ddcCooperativasspa
dc.subject.jelD44spa
dc.subject.jelL11spa
dc.subject.keywordSpecific investmentspa
dc.subject.keywordOutside optionspa
dc.subject.keywordRelationship breakdownspa
dc.titleThe value of cooperative investment in nonexclusive contractsspa
dc.typeworkingPapereng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/draft
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajospa
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