Ítem
Acceso Abierto

Designing a linear pension scheme with forced savings and wage heterogeneity

Mostrar el registro sencillo de la publicación
dc.creatorCremer, Helmuthspa
dc.creatorDe Donder, Philippespa
dc.creatorMaldonado, Dariospa
dc.creatorPestieau, Pierrespa
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-25T23:55:42Z
dc.date.available2020-05-25T23:55:42Z
dc.date.created2008spa
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the optimal linear pension scheme when society consists of rational and myopic individuals. Myopic individuals have, ex ante, a strong preference for the present even though, ex post, they would regret not to have saved enough. While rational and myopic persons share the same ex post intertemporal preferences, only the rational agents make their savings and labor supply decisions according to these preferences. Individuals are also distinguished by their productivity. The social objective is 'paternalistic': the utilitarian welfare function depends on ex post utilities. We examine how the presence of myopic individuals affects both the size of the pension system and the degree of redistribution it operates, with and without liquidity constraints. The relationship between proportion of myopic individuals and characteristics of the pension system turns out to be much more complex than one would have conjectured. Neither the impact on the level of pensions nor the effect on their redistributive degree is unambiguous. Nevertheless, we show that under some plausible assumptions adding myopic individuals increases the level of pension benefits and leads to a shift from a flat or even targeted scheme to a partially contributory one. However, we also provide an example where the degree of redistribution is not a monotonic function of the proportion of myopic individuals. © 2007 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-007-9031-2
dc.identifier.issn15736970
dc.identifier.issn09275940
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22182
dc.language.isoengspa
dc.relation.citationEndPage562
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 5
dc.relation.citationStartPage547
dc.relation.citationTitleInternational Tax and Public Finance
dc.relation.citationVolumeVol. 15
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Tax and Public Finance, ISSN:15736970, 09275940, Vol.15, No.5 (2008); pp. 547-562spa
dc.relation.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-50249107600&doi=10.1007%2fs10797-007-9031-2&partnerID=40&md5=b9e0e75fa97a83f6371c11416cb1b726spa
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subject.keywordDual-self modelspa
dc.subject.keywordMyopiaspa
dc.subject.keywordSocial securityspa
dc.titleDesigning a linear pension scheme with forced savings and wage heterogeneityspa
dc.typearticleeng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spaArtículospa
Archivos
Bloque original
Mostrando1 - 1 de 1
Miniatura
Nombre:
Cremer2008_Article_DesigningALinearPensionSchemeW.pdf
Tamaño:
323.44 KB
Formato:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Descripción:
Descargar
Colecciones
Artículos