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Poor people and risky business

dc.creatorZuleta, Hernando
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-18T15:21:09Z
dc.date.available2015-09-18T15:21:09Z
dc.date.created2006
dc.date.issued2006
dc.description.abstractWe try to explain why economic conflicts and illegal business often take place in poor countries. We use the concept of subsistence level of consumption (d) and assume a regular concave utility function for consumption levels higher than d. For consumption levels lower than d utility is constant and equal to zero. Under this framework poor agents are risk-lovers. This result helps to explain why economic conflicts are more likely to appear in poor economies and why poor agents are more willing to undertake illegal business.eng
dc.format.extent11 páginasspa
dc.format.mediumRecurso electrónicospa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.tipoDocumentospa
dc.identifier.citationZuleta, H. (2006). Poor people and risky business. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10826
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10826
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosariospa
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economíaspa
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 7
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía
dc.relation.ispartofSerie documentos de trabajo. No 7 (Octubre 2006)spa
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/003356.html
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)spa
dc.rights.ccAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombiaspa
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dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subject.ddcProducción
dc.subject.keywordPovertyeng
dc.subject.keywordIncome Distributioneng
dc.subject.keywordIllegal Businesseng
dc.subject.lembDesarrollo económicospa
dc.subject.lembPobreza::Aspectos Económicosspa
dc.subject.lembDistribución de la riquezaspa
dc.subject.lembIlegalidad::Aspectos Económicosspa
dc.titlePoor people and risky businessspa
dc.typeworkingPapereng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajospa
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