Outside directors, board interlocks and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Colombian business groups

Pombo C.; Gutiérrez Ramírez, Luis Hernando

doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2011.01.002

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Outside directors, board interlocks and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Colombian business groups

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dc.creator	Pombo C.	spa
dc.creator	Gutiérrez Ramírez, Luis Hernando	spa
dc.date.accessioned	2020-05-25T23:56:09Z
dc.date.available	2020-05-25T23:56:09Z
dc.date.created	2011	spa
dc.description.abstract	We investigate the relation of board structure through the appointments of outside directors and the role of busy directors on firm return on assets within an environment of no regulation for privately held firms and voluntary adoption of corporate best practices for security issuers with family controlling blockholders. This study relies on a sample of an average of 335 firms per year for the 1996-2006 period, where 244 are private firms and 285 are affiliated to one of the seven largest non-financial business groups in the country. Five of these groups were, in 2006, still family-controlled. We find a positive relation between both the ratio of outside directors, and the degree of board interlocks, with firm return-on-assets. Outside busy directors turned out to be key drivers of improved firm performance. Appointments of outsiders are endogenous to firm ownership structure. Blockholder activism as well as contestability becomes an internal mechanism that improves director monitoring and ex-post firm valuation. © 2011 Elsevier Inc.	eng
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2011.01.002
dc.identifier.issn	1486195
dc.identifier.uri	https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22339
dc.language.iso	eng	spa
dc.relation.citationEndPage	277
dc.relation.citationIssue	No. 4
dc.relation.citationStartPage	251
dc.relation.citationTitle	Journal of Economics and Business
dc.relation.citationVolume	Vol. 63
dc.relation.ispartof	Journal of Economics and Business, ISSN:1486195, Vol.63, No.4 (2011); pp. 251-277	spa
dc.relation.uri	https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-79955953872&doi=10.1016%2fj.jeconbus.2011.01.002&partnerID=40&md5=28219d809f6165466833a9183b77535e	spa
dc.rights.accesRights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.acceso	Abierto (Texto Completo)	spa
dc.source.instname	instname:Universidad del Rosario	spa
dc.source.reponame	reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR	spa
dc.subject.keyword	Board interlocks	spa
dc.subject.keyword	Busy directors	spa
dc.subject.keyword	Colombian corporations	spa
dc.subject.keyword	Control contestability	spa
dc.subject.keyword	Corporate governance	spa
dc.subject.keyword	Firm performance	spa
dc.subject.keyword	Outside directors	spa
dc.title	Outside directors, board interlocks and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Colombian business groups	spa
dc.type	article	eng
dc.type.hasVersion	info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spa	Artículo	spa