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The regulation of health care providers' payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter

dc.creatorBardey D.spa
dc.creatorCanta C.spa
dc.creatorLozachmeur J.-M.spa
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-25T23:56:13Z
dc.date.available2020-05-25T23:56:13Z
dc.date.created2012spa
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the regulation of payment schemes for health care providers competing in both quality and product differentiation of their services. The regulator uses two instruments: a prospective payment per patient and a cost reimbursement rate. When the regulator can only use a prospective payment, the optimal price involves a trade-off between the level of quality provision and the level of horizontal differentiation. If this pure prospective payment leads to underprovision of quality and overdifferentiation, a mixed reimbursement scheme allows the regulator to improve the allocation efficiency. This is true for a relatively low level of patients' transportation costs. We also show that if the regulator cannot commit to the level of the cost reimbursement rate, the resulting allocation can dominate the one with full commitment. This occurs when the transportation cost is low or high enough, and the full commitment solution either implies full or zero cost reimbursement. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2012.04.002
dc.identifier.issn1676296
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22362
dc.language.isoengspa
dc.relation.citationEndPage704
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 5
dc.relation.citationStartPage691
dc.relation.citationTitleJournal of Health Economics
dc.relation.citationVolumeVol. 31
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Health Economics, ISSN:1676296, Vol.31, No.5 (2012); pp. 691-704spa
dc.relation.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84864090706&doi=10.1016%2fj.jhealeco.2012.04.002&partnerID=40&md5=dac0c9eecf0b9fd02192ade329ef4ee6spa
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subject.keywordDifferentiationspa
dc.subject.keywordeconomiceng
dc.subject.keywordHealth servicesspa
dc.subject.keywordRegulatory frameworkspa
dc.subject.keywordArticlespa
dc.subject.keywordEconomic aspectspa
dc.subject.keywordGovernment regulationspa
dc.subject.keywordHealth care costspa
dc.subject.keywordHealth care qualityspa
dc.subject.keywordHealth insurancespa
dc.subject.keywordPatient transportspa
dc.subject.keywordProspective paymentspa
dc.subject.keywordReimbursementspa
dc.subject.keywordRemunerationspa
dc.subject.keywordResource allocationspa
dc.subject.keywordSocial welfarespa
dc.subject.keywordEuropespa
dc.subject.keywordGovernment regulationspa
dc.subject.keywordHealth care costsspa
dc.subject.keywordHealth personnelspa
dc.subject.keywordHumansspa
dc.subject.keywordModelseng
dc.subject.keywordProspective payment systemspa
dc.subject.keywordQuality of health carespa
dc.subject.keywordReimbursement mechanismsspa
dc.subject.keywordHealth carespa
dc.subject.keywordHorizontal and vertical differentiationspa
dc.subject.keywordMixed payment schemesspa
dc.subject.keywordRegulationspa
dc.titleThe regulation of health care providers' payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matterspa
dc.typearticleeng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spaArtículospa
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