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Auctions with endogenous participation and an uncertain number of bidders: experimental evidence

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dc.creatorAycinena Abascal, Diegospa
dc.creatorRentschler,Lucasspa
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-06T16:21:32Z
dc.date.available2020-08-06T16:21:32Z
dc.date.created2017spa
dc.description.abstractAttracting bidders to an auction is a key factor in determining revenue. We experimentally investigate entry and bidding behavior in first-price and English clock auctions to determine the revenue implications of entry. Potential bidders observe their value and then decide whether or not to incur a cost to enter. We also vary whether or not bidders are informed regarding the number of entrants prior to placing their bids. Revenue equivalence is predicted in all four environments. We find that, regardless of whether or not bidders are informed, first-price auctions generate more revenue than English clock auctions. Within a given auction format, the effect of informing bidders differs. In first-price auctions, revenue is higher when bidders are informed, while the opposite is true in English clock auctions. The optimal choice for an auction designer who wishes to maximize revenue is a first-price auction with uninformed bidders.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-017-9558-8
dc.identifier.issnISSN: 1386-4157
dc.identifier.issnEISSN: 1573-6938
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/26390
dc.language.isoengspa
dc.publisherSpringer Naturespa
dc.relation.citationEndPage949
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 21
dc.relation.citationStartPage924
dc.relation.citationTitleExperimental Economics
dc.relation.ispartofExperimental Economics, ISSN:1386-4157;EISSN:1573-6938.No.21 (2018);PP.924-949spa
dc.relation.urihttps://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-017-9558-8spa
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.accesoRestringido (Acceso a grupos específicos)spa
dc.sourceExperimental Economicsspa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.subject.keywordAuctionsspa
dc.subject.keywordRevenue equivalencespa
dc.subject.keywordEndogenous entryspa
dc.subject.keywordExperimentsspa
dc.subject.keywordBiddingspa
dc.titleAuctions with endogenous participation and an uncertain number of bidders: experimental evidencespa
dc.title.TranslatedTitleSubastas con participación endógena y un número incierto de postores: evidencia experimentalspa
dc.typearticleeng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spaArtículospa
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