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To suggest is to commit? a common pool resource experiment with non-enforceable recommendations

dc.creatorMantilla Ribero, César Andrés
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-19T14:41:02Z
dc.date.available2020-08-19T14:41:02Z
dc.date.created2015-12spa
dc.description.abstractI report the results of an artefactual field experiment conducted with Colombian artisanal fishermen. I set up a common pool resource game in which subjects exchange recommendations prior to the extraction decision. The classical tension of this game between individual and collective incentives opens the door for strategic communication. However, I find that subjects are highly consistent with their transmitted message and, to some extent, responsive to the incoming recommendation. Recommendations are efficiency enhancing: extraction levels are lower when the outgoing and the incoming messages are closer to each other. This is particularly relevant in treatments with a high proportion of cooperative recommendations. I link experimental behavior with survey data and I find that lying behavior is negatively correlated with the ratio between the (reported) satisfactory and realized earnings from the fishermen.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2015.09.001
dc.identifier.issnISSN: 2214-8043
dc.identifier.issnEISSN: 2214-8051
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/27116
dc.language.isoengspa
dc.publisherElsevierspa
dc.relation.citationEndPage20
dc.relation.citationStartPage13
dc.relation.citationTitleJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
dc.relation.citationVolumeVol. 59
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, ISSN: 2214-8043;EISSN: 2214-8051, Vol.59 (2015); pp. 13-20spa
dc.relation.urihttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214804315001044spa
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.accesoRestringido (Acceso a grupos específicos)spa
dc.sourceJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economicsspa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.subject.keywordConsistencyspa
dc.subject.keywordFisheriesspa
dc.subject.keywordLie aversionspa
dc.subject.keywordResponsivenessspa
dc.titleTo suggest is to commit? a common pool resource experiment with non-enforceable recommendationsspa
dc.title.TranslatedTitle¿Sugerir es comprometerse? un experimento de recursos de uso común con recomendaciones que no se pueden hacer cumplirspa
dc.typearticleeng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spaArtículospa
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