Ítem
Acceso Abierto
Redesigning payments for ecosystem services to increase cost-effectiveness
| dc.contributor.gruplac | Grupo de investigaciones. Facultad de Economía. Universidad del Rosario | |
| dc.creator | Saavedra Pineda, Santiago | |
| dc.creator | Jayachandran, Seema | |
| dc.creator | Izquierdo-Tort, Santiago | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-02-01T14:48:44Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-02-01T14:48:44Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2024-01-30 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2024-01-31 | |
| dc.description | Los pagos por servicios ambientales (PSA) son un enfoque ampliamente utilizado para incentivar esfuerzos de conservación como evitar deforestación. Aunque la efectividad de los PSA ha recibido importante atención académica, se ha estudiado menos si las modificaciones del diseño de PSA pueden mejorar los resultados del programa. Presentamos los resultados de un experimento controlado aleatorio en México que probó si un contrato de PSA que requiere que los participantes inscriban todo su bosque es más efectivo que el contrato tradicional de PSA que les permite elegir que parte del bosque inscribir. El objetivo de la modificación es evitar que los propietarios de terrenos inscriban sólo las parcelas que planeaban conservar de todos modos, dejando de lado otras parcelas para deforestar. Encontramos que el tratamiento de inscripción completa reduce significativamente la deforestación en comparación con el contrato tradicional. Esta conservación extra se produce a pesar de una menor tasa de cumplimiento en el tratamiento, debido a su carácter más estricto. El tratamiento con inscripción completa cuadruplicó la rentabilidad, destacando el potencial de mejorar sustancialmente la eficacia de los pagos de conservación mediante simples modificaciones del contrato. | |
| dc.description.abstract | Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) are a widely used approach to incentivize conservation efforts such as avoided deforestation. Although PES effectiveness has received significant scholarly attention, whether PES design modifications can improve program outcomes is less explored. We present findings from a randomized trial in Mexico that tested whether a PES contract that requires enrollees to enroll all of their forest is more effective than the traditional PES contract that allows them to exercise choice. The modification’s aim is to prevent landowners from enrolling only parcels they planned to conserve anyway while leaving aside other parcels to deforest. We find that the full-enrollment treatment significantly reduces deforestation compared to the traditional contract. This extra conservation occurs despite the full-enrollment provision reducing the compliance rate due to its more stringent requirements. The full-enrollment treatment quadrupled cost-effectiveness, highlighting the potential to substantially improve the efficacy of conservation payments through simple contract modifications. | |
| dc.format.extent | 35 pp | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_42192 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/42192 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Universidad del Rosario | |
| dc.publisher.department | Facultad de Economía | |
| dc.relation.uri | https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/021022.html | |
| dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International | * |
| dc.rights.accesRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.rights.acceso | Abierto (Texto Completo) | |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | * |
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| dc.source.instname | instname:Universidad del Rosario | |
| dc.source.reponame | reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR | |
| dc.subject | Deforestación | |
| dc.subject | Pagos por servicios ecosistémicos | |
| dc.subject | Incentivos financieros | |
| dc.subject | Diseño de contratos | |
| dc.subject.jel | Q23 | |
| dc.subject.jel | Q58 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | Deforestation | |
| dc.subject.keyword | Payments for ecosystem services | |
| dc.subject.keyword | Financial incentives | |
| dc.subject.keyword | Contract design | |
| dc.subject.keyword | Mexico | |
| dc.title | Redesigning payments for ecosystem services to increase cost-effectiveness | |
| dc.type | article | |
| dc.type.hasVersion | info:eu-repo/semantics/draft | |
| dc.type.spa | Artículo |
