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A mechanism for the efficient provision of Potential Pareto public goods

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dc.creatorFerraz Castelo Branco Ferreira, Eduardospa
dc.creatorMantilla Ribero, César Andrésspa
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-31T18:19:36Z
dc.date.available2024-01-31T18:19:36Z
dc.date.created2023-09-01spa
dc.date.issued2023spa
dc.descriptionProviding a public good that causes a local harm to its host poses two problems previously unexplored together: where to locate it and how large it should be. We propose a mechanism combining some market-like properties with a modified second-price auction. The mechanism selects a host, a facility size, a compensation for hosting the project, and determines how the compensation is split among the non-hosts. If each community bids truthfully for becoming the host–a strategy from which no community has incentives to deviate–the selected allocation is globally optimal, even if communities’ preferences are private information. In contrast with the literature, the host pays the second-highest bid while receiving the market benefits to prevent distortions in the optimal size.spa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfspa
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104953spa
dc.identifier.issn0047-2727spa
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/42091
dc.language.isoengspa
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosariospa
dc.relation.urihttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272723001354spa
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 Internationalspa
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessspa
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/spa
dc.sourceJournal of Public Economicsspa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subjectNIMBYspa
dc.subjectLULUspa
dc.subjectLindahlspa
dc.subjectoutcomes Public projectsspa
dc.subjectMechanism designspa
dc.titleA mechanism for the efficient provision of Potential Pareto public goodsspa
dc.typearticlespa
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionspa
dc.type.spaArtículospa
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