Ítem
Solo Metadatos

Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games

Mostrar el registro sencillo de la publicación
dc.creatorMantilla Ribero, César Andrés
dc.creatorSethi, Rajivspa
dc.creatorCárdenas, Juan Camilospa
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-25T23:56:29Z
dc.date.available2020-05-25T23:56:29Z
dc.date.created2020spa
dc.description.abstractMost models of social preferences and bounded rationality that are effective in explaining efficiency-increasing departures from equilibrium behavior cannot easily account for similar deviations when they are efficiency-reducing. We show that the notion of sampling equilibrium, subject to a suitable stability refinement, can account for behavior in both efficiency-enhancing and efficiency-reducing conditions. In particular, in public goods games with dominant strategy equilibria, stable sampling equilibrium can involve the play of dominated strategies with positive probability both when such behavior increases aggregate payoffs (relative to the standard prediction) and when it reduces aggregate payoffs. The dominant strategy equilibrium prediction changes abruptly from zero contribution to full contribution as a parameter crosses a threshold, whereas the stable sampling equilibrium remains fully mixed throughout. This is consistent with the available experimental evidence. © 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12351
dc.identifier.issn14679779
dc.identifier.issn10973923
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22441
dc.language.isoengspa
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Inc.spa
dc.relation.citationEndPage370
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 2
dc.relation.citationStartPage355
dc.relation.citationTitleJournal of Public Economic Theory
dc.relation.citationVolumeVol. 22
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Public Economic Theory, ISSN:14679779, 10973923, Vol.22, No.2 (2020); pp. 355-370spa
dc.relation.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85059065703&doi=10.1111%2fjpet.12351&partnerID=40&md5=65705030d15ef0cf095022b849dabbddspa
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subject.keywordEfficiencyspa
dc.subject.keywordstabilityspa
dc.subject.keywordsamplingspa
dc.subject.keywordequilibriumspa
dc.subject.keywordpublicspa
dc.subject.keywordgoodsspa
dc.subject.keywordgamesspa
dc.titleEfficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods gamesspa
dc.typearticleeng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spaArtículospa
Archivos
Colecciones
Artículos