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Endogenous Taxation in Ongoing Internal Conflict: The Case of Colombia

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dc.creatorCH, RAFAELspa
dc.creatorSHAPIRO, JACOBspa
dc.creatorSTEELE, ABBEYspa
dc.creatorVargas Duque, Juan Fernandospa
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-26T00:10:26Z
dc.date.available2020-05-26T00:10:26Z
dc.date.created2018spa
dc.description.abstractRecent empirical evidence suggests an ambiguous relationship between internal conflicts, state capacity, and tax performance. In theory, internal conflict should create strong incentives for governments to develop the fiscal capacity necessary to defeat rivals. We argue that one reason that this does not occur is because internal conflict enables groups with de facto power to capture local fiscal and property rights institutions. We test this mechanism in Colombia using data on tax performance and property rights institutions at the municipal level. Municipalities affected by internal conflict have tax institutions consistent with the preferences of the parties dominating local violence. Those suffering more right-wing violence feature more land formalization and higher property tax revenues. Municipalities with substantial left-wing guerrilla violence collect less tax revenue and witness less land formalization. Our findings provide systematic evidence that internal armed conflict helps interest groups capture municipal institutions for their own private benefit, impeding state-building. Copyright © American Political Science Association 2018.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000333
dc.identifier.issn15375943
dc.identifier.issn00030554
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24229
dc.language.isoengspa
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressspa
dc.relation.citationEndPage917
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 4
dc.relation.citationStartPage905
dc.relation.citationTitleAmerican Political Science Review
dc.relation.citationVolumeVol. 112
dc.relation.ispartofAmerican Political Science Review, ISSN:15375943, 00030554, Vol.112, No.4 (2018); pp. 905-917spa
dc.relation.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85052639502&doi=10.1017%2fS0003055418000333&partnerID=40&md5=f52f9e45a8624dbebb8b7e439d0b4b19spa
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subject.keywordEndogenousspa
dc.subject.keywordTaxationspa
dc.subject.keywordOngoingspa
dc.subject.keywordInternalspa
dc.subject.keywordConflictspa
dc.subject.keywordCasespa
dc.subject.keywordColombiaspa
dc.titleEndogenous Taxation in Ongoing Internal Conflict: The Case of Colombiaspa
dc.typearticleeng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spaArtículospa
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