Provision of noxious facilities using a market-like mechanism: A simple implementation in the lab

Mantilla Ribero, César Andrés; Alberti, Federica

doi:https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_45586

Ítem

Acceso Abierto

Provision of noxious facilities using a market-like mechanism: A simple implementation in the lab

Mostrar el registro sencillo de la publicación

dc.creator	Mantilla Ribero, César Andrés	spa
dc.creator	Alberti, Federica	spa
dc.date.accessioned	2025-06-05T20:21:48Z
dc.date.available	2025-06-05T20:21:48Z
dc.date.created	2020-03-01	spa
dc.date.issued	2020-03-01	spa
dc.description	We study the provision of a public project that globally behaves as a public good but locally behaves as a private bad. This scenario imposes two problems: (i) finding a compensation that makes the project acceptable for the pre-determined host, and (ii) securing the budget to pay for the project and the required compensation. We use a market-like mechanism with two useful properties for this scenario: players can either contribute or request subsidies to fund the public project, and players have veto power over the desired project quantity. In our game, two players benefit from a waste incinerator facility, whereas the third group member, the host, is harmed if the facility is too large. We analyze the efficiency and the redistributive potential of this mechanism, with and without communication, among group members. We find that the probability of positive provision did not differ with and without communication. However, average provided quantities with respect to the efficient quantity increased from 54% to 81% with communication. We also find that contributions fell below the Lindahl taxes, allowing the players who benefit from a larger facility to accrue most of the efficiency gains. The latter result is consistent with the infrequent evidence of veto threats as a bargaining strategy.	spa
dc.format.extent	43 pp	spa
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	spa
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_45586
dc.identifier.uri	https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/45586
dc.language.iso	eng	spa
dc.publisher	Universidad del Rosario	spa
dc.publisher	Alianza EFI	spa
dc.publisher.department	Facultad de Economía	spa
dc.rights	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International	spa
dc.rights.accesRights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	spa
dc.rights.acceso	Abierto (Texto Completo)	spa
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/	spa
dc.source.instname	instname:Universidad del Rosario	spa
dc.source.reponame	reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR	spa
dc.subject.keyword	Lab experiment	eng
dc.subject.keyword	NIMBY	eng
dc.subject.keyword	LULU	eng
dc.subject.keyword	Public goods	eng
dc.title	Provision of noxious facilities using a market-like mechanism: A simple implementation in the lab	spa
dc.type	workingPaper	spa
dc.type.hasVersion	info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion	spa
dc.type.spa	Documento de trabajo	spa
local.department.report	Facultad de Economía