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Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare [preprint]

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dc.creatorJaramillo, Paulaspa
dc.creatorKayi, Cagatayspa
dc.creatorKlijn, Flipspa
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-11T13:21:04Z
dc.date.available2020-06-11T13:21:04Z
dc.date.created2013spa
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies many-to-one matching markets where each student is assigned to a hospital. Each hospital has possibly multiple positions and responsive preferences. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that there can be unstable equilibrium outcomes. We prove that any stable matching can be obtained in some equilibrium. We also show that the exhaustive class of dropping strategies does not necessarily generate the full set of equilibrium outcomes. Finally, we find that the so-called ‘rural hospital theorem' cannot be extended to the set of equilibrium outcomes and that welfare levels are in general unrelated to the set of stable matchings. Two important consequences are that, contrary to one-to-one matching markets, (a) filled positions depend on the particular equilibrium that is reached and (b) welfare levels are not bounded by the student and hospital-optimal stable matchings (with respect to the true preferences).eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2262356
dc.identifier.issn1657-7191
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24714
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniversidad de los Andesspa
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 23
dc.relation.citationTitleDocumentos CEDE
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos CEDE, ISSN: 1657-7191, No. 23 (Abril, 2013); pp.spa
dc.relation.urihttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstream/handle/1992/8410/dcede2013-23.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=yspa
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subject.keywordDeferred acceptancespa
dc.subject.keywordDropping strategiesspa
dc.subject.keywordFilled positionsspa
dc.subject.keywordMany- to-one matchingspa
dc.subject.keywordNash equilibriumspa
dc.subject.keywordWelfarespa
dc.titleEquilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare [preprint]spa
dc.title.TranslatedTitleEquilibrios bajo el mecanismo de aceptación diferida: Estrategias de eliminación, posiciones ocupadas y bienestarspa
dc.typepreprinteng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/draft
dc.type.spaPre-printspa
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