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Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab

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dc.contributor.gruplacGrupo de Investigaciones. Facultad de Economía. Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.creatorFajardo, Gustavo
dc.creatorBrassiolo, Pablo
dc.creatorVargas Duque, Juan Fernando
dc.creatorEstrada, Ricardo
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-26T22:03:48Z
dc.date.available2020-05-26T22:03:48Z
dc.date.created2020-05-24
dc.date.issued2020-05-24
dc.descriptionEstudiamos si las oportunidades para extraer rentas en un trabajo afectan el tipo de personas que se sienten atraídas por él en términos de su integridad subyacente. Lo hacemos en un experimento de laboratorio en el que los participantes eligen entre dos contratos que involucran diferentes tareas. Introducimos experimentalmente la posibilidad de injerto en uno de ellos y estudiamos la clasificación de los sujetos en los contratos en función de una medida de honestidad incentivada. Encontramos que el contrato corruptible cambia la composición de los sujetos porque atrae a los individuos más deshonestos y repele a los más honestos. Además, observamos un injerto extenso cuando la oportunidad está disponible. Introducimos una estrategia de aleatorización doble para desenredar la medida en que el robo responde a la selección negativa antes mencionada oa incentivos puros (netos de selección). Encontramos que, en este contexto, la selección es el principal impulsor del injerto. Nuestros resultados tienen implicaciones políticas claras para frenar la corrupción.spa
dc.description.abstractWe study whether opportunities to extract rents in a job affect the type of individuals who are attracted to it in terms of their underlying integrity. We do so in a laboratory experiment in which participants choose between two contracts that involve different tasks. We experimentally introduce the possibility of graft in one of them and study the sorting of subjects across contracts based on an incentivized measure of honesty. We find that the corruptible contract changes the composition of subjects because it attracts the most dishonest individuals and repels the most honest ones. In addition, we observe extensive graft when the opportunity is available. We introduce a double randomization strategy to disentangle the extent of which stealing responds to the aforementioned negative selection or to pure incentives (net of selection). We find that, in this setting, selection is the main driver of graft. Our results have clear policy implications to curb corruption.spa
dc.format.extent28spa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationBrassiolo, Pablo; Estrada, Ricardo; Fajardo, Gustavo; Vargas F., Juan (2020) Self-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Lab. Universidad del Rosario, Department of Economics, Documentos de trabajo economía. 28 pp.spa
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_24370
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24370
dc.language.isospa
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/018179.html
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
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dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subjectCorrupciónspa
dc.subjectSelecciónspa
dc.subjectOportunidades de extracción de alquileresspa
dc.subjectEconomía del personalspa
dc.subject.ddcAdministración públicaspa
dc.subject.ddcProblemas sociales & bienestar social en generalspa
dc.subject.jelC91spa
dc.subject.jelD73spa
dc.subject.jelM5spa
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionspa
dc.subject.keywordSelectionspa
dc.subject.keywordRent extraction opportunitiesspa
dc.subject.keywordPersonnel economicsspa
dc.titleSelf-Selection into Corruption: Evidence from the Labspa
dc.typeworkingPapereng
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajospa
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