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Valuation structure in incomplete information contests: experimental evidence

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dc.creatorAycinena Abascal, Diegospa
dc.creatorBaltaduonis R.spa
dc.creatorRentschler L.spa
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-25T23:58:40Z
dc.date.available2020-05-25T23:58:40Z
dc.date.created2019spa
dc.description.abstractWe experimentally examine perfectly discriminating contests under three valuation structures: pure common-value, pure private-value and a case with both private and common value components. In line with the results from the previous literature, we find that, regardless of valuation structure, contestants often choose very conservative expenditures, and very aggressive expenditures. Average expenditures exceed Nash equilibrium predictions. In valuation structures with a common value component, contestants often choose expenditures in excess of the expected value of the prize conditional on winning the contest. That is, they often guarantee themselves negative payoffs in expectation. © 2018, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0568-7
dc.identifier.issn15737101
dc.identifier.issn00485829
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22908
dc.language.isoengspa
dc.publisherSpringer New York LLCspa
dc.relation.citationEndPage208
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 43924
dc.relation.citationStartPage195
dc.relation.citationTitlePublic Choice
dc.relation.citationVolumeVol. 179
dc.relation.ispartofPublic Choice, ISSN:15737101, 00485829, Vol.179, No.43924 (2019); pp. 195-208spa
dc.relation.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85048797591&doi=10.1007%2fs11127-018-0568-7&partnerID=40&md5=ef757f987d9d2ec22c3ddb0f2415e964spa
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subject.keywordContestsspa
dc.subject.keywordExperimentsspa
dc.subject.keywordWinner’s cursespa
dc.titleValuation structure in incomplete information contests: experimental evidencespa
dc.typearticleeng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spaArtículospa
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