Competition and the hold-up problem: a setting with non exclusive contracts

Roig Roig, Guillem

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Competition and the hold-up problem: a setting with non exclusive contracts

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dc.creator	Roig Roig, Guillem
dc.date.accessioned	2020-09-11T21:05:39Z
dc.date.available	2020-09-11T21:05:39Z
dc.date.created	2014-03-26	spa
dc.description.abstract	This work studies how the introduction of competition to the side of the market offering trading contracts affects the equilibrium investment profile in a bilateral investment game. By using a common agency framework, where contracts are not exclusive, we find that the equilibrium investment profile depends on the competitiveness of the equilibrium outcome. Full efficiency can only be implemented when the trading outcome is the most competitive. Moreover, lowering the outcome competitiveness is not always Pareto dominant for the parties offering the contracts, and larger social welfare can be obtained with low competitive equilibria.	eng
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.uri	https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/29850
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Toulouse School of Economics	spa
dc.relation.citationIssue	No. 481
dc.relation.citationTitle	TSE Working Papers
dc.relation.ispartof	TSE Working Papers, No. 481 (March 2014); 48 pp.	spa
dc.relation.uri	http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/15874/	spa
dc.rights.accesRights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.acceso	Abierto (Texto Completo)	spa
dc.source	TSE Working Papers	spa
dc.source.instname	instname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponame	reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.subject.keyword	Hold-up	spa
dc.subject.keyword	Bilateral investment	spa
dc.subject.keyword	Common agency	spa
dc.subject.keyword	Competition	spa
dc.subject.keyword	Welfare	spa
dc.title	Competition and the hold-up problem: a setting with non exclusive contracts	spa
dc.title.TranslatedTitle	La competencia y el problema de los atracos: un escenario con contratos no exclusivos	spa
dc.type	preprint	eng
dc.type.hasVersion	info:eu-repo/semantics/draft
dc.type.spa	Pre-print	spa