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Self-enforcing clientelism

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dc.creatorGallego Durán, Jorge Andrés
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-19T14:40:33Z
dc.date.available2020-08-19T14:40:33Z
dc.date.created2015-07-01spa
dc.description.abstractPolitical clientelism is a dyadic relation in which a politician (the patron) gives material goods and services to a citizen (the client), in exchange for political support. If, at different stages of this relationship, both the patron and the client have incentives to defect and not honor informal agreements, what makes clientelism self-enforcing? The following paper presents a game-theoretical model of political clientelism in which a candidate disciplines a majority of voters through the promise of a future flow of benefits. A mixed strategy involving a randomized allocation of resources among constituencies makes clientelism feasible when the politician’s action is contingent on the result of the election. Higher campaign budgets and lower voter aversion towards clientelistic parties, as well as higher patience and higher heterogeneity across groups of voters, make clientelism more likely. Swing voters tend to be gifted more frequently than core supporters with this frequency increasing as group heterogeneity increases, presenting a positive association.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1177/0951629814533840
dc.identifier.issnISSN: 0951-6298
dc.identifier.issnEISSN: 1460-3667
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/26931
dc.language.isoengspa
dc.publisherSAGE Publicationsspa
dc.relation.citationEndPage427
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 3
dc.relation.citationStartPage401
dc.relation.citationTitleJournal of Theoretical Politics
dc.relation.citationVolumeVol. 27
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Theoretical Politics, ISSN: 0951-6298;EISSN: 1460-3667, Vol.27, No.3 (2015); pp. 401-427spa
dc.relation.urihttps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951629814533840spa
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.accesoRestringido (Acceso a grupos específicos)spa
dc.sourceJournal of Theoretical Politicsspa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.subject.keywordClientelismspa
dc.subject.keywordElectionsspa
dc.subject.keywordHeterogeneous societyspa
dc.subject.keywordPatronagespa
dc.subject.keywordRepeated gamesspa
dc.titleSelf-enforcing clientelismspa
dc.title.TranslatedTitleClientelismo autoritariospa
dc.typearticleeng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spaArtículospa
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