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Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: A within-subjects analysis

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dc.creatorBlanco, Mariana
dc.creatorEngelmann, Dirkspa
dc.creatorKoch, Alexander K.spa
dc.creatorNormann, Hans-Theospa
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-26T00:08:50Z
dc.date.available2020-05-26T00:08:50Z
dc.date.created2014spa
dc.description.abstractIn empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction channels. When subjects play both roles in such experiments, a positive correlation between first- and second-mover behavior is frequently reported. We find that the observed correlation primarily originates via an indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs through a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. Specifically, beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs. However, we also find evidence for a direct, preference-based channel. When first movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have predictive power regarding their first moves. © 2014 Elsevier Inc.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.005
dc.identifier.issn10902473
dc.identifier.issn08998256
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24119
dc.language.isoengspa
dc.publisherAcademic Press Inc.spa
dc.relation.citationEndPage135
dc.relation.citationStartPage122
dc.relation.citationTitleGames and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.citationVolumeVol. 87
dc.relation.ispartofGames and Economic Behavior, ISSN:10902473, 08998256, Vol.87,(2014); pp. 122-135spa
dc.relation.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84901657989&doi=10.1016%2fj.geb.2014.05.005&partnerID=40&md5=831d7c042853622dff95616e201c7e54spa
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subject.keywordBeliefsspa
dc.subject.keywordConsensus effectspa
dc.subject.keywordExperimental economicsspa
dc.subject.keywordSocial dilemmaspa
dc.titlePreferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: A within-subjects analysisspa
dc.typearticleeng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spaArtículospa
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