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Corruption and Firms

dc.contributor.gruplacGrupo de Investigaciones. Facultad de Economía. Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.creatorColonnelli, Emanuele
dc.creatorPrem, Mounu
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-25T14:33:51Z
dc.date.available2019-09-25T14:33:51Z
dc.date.created2019-09-19
dc.date.issued2019-09-24
dc.description.abstractWe estimate the causal real economic effects of a randomized anti-corruption crackdown on local governments in Brazil over the period 2003-2014. After anti-corruption audits, municipalities experience an increase in economic activity concentrated in sectors most dependent on government relationships. These effects spill over to nearby municipalities and are larger when the audits are covered by the media. Back-of-the-envelope estimates suggest that $1 away from corruption generates more than $3 in local value added. Using administrative matched employer-employee and firm-level datasets and novel face-to-face firm surveys we argue that corruption mostly acts as a barrier to entry, and by introducing costs and distortions on local government-dependent firms. The political misallocation of resources across firms plays a seemingly secondary role, indicating that at the local level most rents are captured by politicians and public officials rather than firms.eng
dc.format.extent57spa
dc.format.mimetypetext/html
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_20334
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/20334
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/017430.html
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.subject.ddcEconomíaspa
dc.subject.jelD73spa
dc.subject.jelH83spa
dc.subject.jelD22spa
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionspa
dc.subject.keywordFirmsspa
dc.subject.keywordAuditsspa
dc.subject.lembEconomíaspa
dc.subject.lembCorrupciónspa
dc.titleCorruption and Firmsspa
dc.typeworkingPapereng
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajospa
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