Ítem
Solo Metadatos
Informed entry in auctions
Título de la revista
Autores
Aycinena Abascal, Diego
Bejarano H.
Rentschler L.
Fecha
2018
Directores
ISSN de la revista
Título del volumen
Editor
Springer Verlag
Citations
Métricas alternativas
Resumen
Abstract
We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference in WTP between auction formats, although males have a higher WTP for first-price auctions. WTP is decreasing in the number of potential bidders, but this reduction is less than predicted and small in magnitude. © 2017, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany.
Palabras clave
Keywords
Auctions , Bidding , Endogenous entry , Experiments
