Acceso Abierto

Price discrimination under non-uniform calling circles and call externalities

dc.contributor.gruplacGrupo de investigaciones. Facultad de Economía. Universidad del Rosarioes
dc.creatorClavijo, Renzo
dc.description.abstractThis work develops a competition model between two asymmetrical networks with calling circles, allowing subscribers to derive utility by receiving calls. Unlike the traditional literature predictions, in equilibrium firms have strategies to set off-net price below on-net price. In markets where consumers display strongly concentrated calling patterns, firms can only extract limited surplus from off-net calls. This is reinforced if consumers display weak call externalities, languishing the price strategies to discourage off-net calls. Furthermore, regulating price differential of the large firm can lead consumers to face higher fees compared to discriminatory setting. Therefore, regulators should broaden efforts to measure call externalities and calling circles strength before making decisions on retail tariff regulation.es
dc.format.extent42 ppes
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosario
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economía
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia*
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)es
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAgostini, Claudio A; Willington, Manuel; Lazcano, Raúl; Saavedra, Eduardo (2017) Predation and network based price discrimination in Chile. En: Telecommunications Policy. Vol. 41; No. 9; pp. 781-791 : Elsevier;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAker, Jenny C; Collier, Paul; Vicente, Pedro C (2017) Is information power? Using mobile phones and free newspapers during an. En: Review of Economics and Statistics. Vol. 99; No. 2; pp. 185-200 : MIT Press;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationArmstrong, Mark; Doyle, Chris; Vickers, John (1996) The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis. En: The Journal of Industrial Economics. Vol. 44; No. 2; pp. 131-150 : Wiley; 0022-1821; Disponible en: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2950642.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationArmstrong, Mark (1998) Network Interconnection in Telecommunications. En: The Economic Journal. Vol. 108; No. 448; pp. 545-564 : Wiley on behalf of the Royal Economic Society; 0013-0133; Disponible en: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2565782.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationArmstrong, Mark; Sappington, David E M (2007) Recent developments in the theory of regulation. En: Handbook of industrial organization. Vol. 3; pp. 1557-1700 : Elsevier;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationArmstrong, Mark; Wright, Julian (2009) Mobile Call Termination*. En: The Economic Journal. Vol. 119; No. 538; pp. F270-F307 : Blackwell Publishing Ltd; 1468-0297; Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02276.x. Disponible en: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02276.x.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBerger, Ulrich (2005) Bill-and-keep vs. cost-based access pricing revisited. En: Economics Letters. Vol. 86; No. 1; pp. 107-112 : Elsevier;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBerger, Ulrich (2005) Access charges in the presence of call externalities. En: The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy. Vol. 3; No. 1; pp. 1-16 : De Gruyter;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBirke, Daniel; Swann, G M Peter (2010) Network effects, network structure and consumer interaction in mobile. En: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Vol. 76; No. 2; pp. 153-167 : Elsevier;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationCalzada, Joan; Valletti, Tommaso M (2008) Network competition and entry deterrence. En: The Economic Journal. Vol. 118; No. 531; pp. 1223-1244 : Oxford University Press Oxford, UK;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationCarter, Michael; Wright, Julian (2003) Asymmetric network interconnection. En: Review of Industrial Organization. Vol. 22; No. 1; pp. 27-46 : Springer;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationChambouleyron, Andrés; Schoeters, Marcelo (2008) Telecomunicaciones en Colombia: Diagnóstico y Remedios.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationDeGraba, Patrick (2003) Efficient intercarrier compensation for competing networks when customers. En: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. Vol. 12; No. 2; pp. 207-230 : Wiley Online Library;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationDessein, Wouter (2003) Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing. En: The RAND Journal of Economics. Vol. 34; No. 4; pp. 593-611 : Wiley on behalf of RAND Corporation; 0741-6261; Disponible en: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1593778.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationDessein, Wouter (2004) Network competition with heterogeneous customers and calling patterns. En: Information Economics and Policy. Vol. 16; No. 3; pp. 323-345 : Elsevier;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationYepes, Tito; Vivas, Alejandro; Muñoz, Isabella; Becerra, Alejandro; Castro, Felipe; Junca, Juan C; Quiñones, Arturo (2012) Evaluación del marco regulatorio expedido por la Comisión de Regulación de.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Vagstad, Steinar (2008) Why is on-net traffic cheaper than off-net traffic? Access markup as a. En: European Economic Review. Vol. 52; No. 1; pp. 99-115 : Elsevier;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGenakos, Christos; Valletti, Tommaso (2012) Regulating prices in two-sided markets: The waterbed experience in mobile. En: Telecommunications policy. Vol. 36; No. 5; pp. 360-368 : Elsevier;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGenakos, Christos; Valletti, Tommaso (2015) Evaluating a Decade of Mobile Termination Rate Regulation. En: Economic Journal. No. 586; pp. 31
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGeoffron, Patrice; Wang, Haobo (2008) What is the mobile termination regime for the asymmetric firms with a. En: International Journal of Management and Network Economics. Vol. 1; No. 1; pp. 58-79 : Inderscience;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHarbord, David; Hoernig, Steffen (2010) Welfare analysis of regulating mobile termination rates in the UK (with an. En: SSRN. Vol. 1564083;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHarbord, David; Hoernig, Steffen (2015) Welfare Analysis of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates in the UK. En: The Journal of Industrial Economics. Vol. 63; No. 4; pp. 673-703 : Wiley Online Library;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHarbord, David; Pagnozzi, Marco (2010) Network-based price discrimination. En: Review of Network Economics. Vol. 9; No. 1; De Gruyter;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHermalin, Benjamin; Katz, Michael (2001) Network interconnection with two-sided user benefits. : Mimeo, UC Berkeley;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHermalin, Benjamin E; Katz, Michael L (2004) Sender or Receiver: Who should pay to exchange an electronic message?. En: RAND Journal of Economics. pp. 423-448 : JSTOR;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHoernig, Steffen (2007) On-net and off-net pricing on asymmetric telecommunications networks. En: Information Economics and Policy. Vol. 19; No. 2; pp. 171-188 : Elsevier;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHoernig, Steffen (2008) Tariff-Mediated Network Externalities: Is Regulatory Intervention Any. En: Vol.: Nova School of Business and Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research; Disponible en: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1146829.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHoernig, Steffen (2009) Competition between multiple asymmetric networks: A toolkit and. : Mimeo. FEUNL;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHoernig, Steffen; Inderst, Roman; Valletti, Tommaso (2011) Calling Circles: Network Competition with Non-Uniform Calling Patterns. : Tor Vergata University, CEIS; Disponible en: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:206.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHoernig, Steffen; Inderst, Roman; Valletti, Tommaso (2014) Calling circles: network competition with nonuniform calling patterns. En: The RAND Journal of Economics. Vol. 45; No. 1; pp. 155-175 : Wiley Online Library;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHotelling, Harold (1929) Stability in Competition. En: The Economic Journal. Vol. 39; No. 153; pp. 41-57 : [Royal Economic Society, Wiley]; 0013-0133; Disponible en: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2224214.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHurkens, Sjaak; López, ??ngel L (2014) Mobile Termination, Network Externalities and Consumer Expectations. En: The Economic Journal. Vol. 124; No. 579; pp. 1005-1039 1468-0297; Disponible en: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12097. Disponible en: 10.1111/ecoj.12097.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationJack, William; Suri, Tavneet (2014) Risk sharing and transactions costs: Evidence from Kenya's mobile money. En: American Economic Review. Vol. 104; No. 1; pp. 183-223
dc.source.bibliographicCitationJeon, Doh-Shin; Laffont, Jean-Jacques; Tirole, Jean (2004) On the "receiver-pays" principle. En: RAND Journal of Economics. pp. 85-110 : JSTOR;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationJullien, Bruno; Rey, Patrick; Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2013) Termination fees revisited. En: International Journal of Industrial Organization. Vol. 31; No. 6; pp. 738-750 : Elsevier;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKatz, Michael L; Shapiro, Carl (1985) Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility. En: The American Economic Review. Vol. 75; No. 3; pp. 424-440 : American Economic Association; 0002-8282; Disponible en: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1814809.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKim, Jeong-Yoo; Lim, Yoonsung (2001) An economic analysis of the receiver pays principle. En: Information Economics and Policy. Vol. 13; No. 2; pp. 231-260 : Elsevier;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationLaffont, Jean-Jacques; Tirole, Jean (1994) Access pricing and competition. En: European Economic Review. Vol. 38; No. 9; pp. 1673-1710 : Elsevier;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationLaffont, Jean-Jacques; Rey, Patrick; Tirole, Jean (1998) Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing. En: The RAND Journal of Economics. Vol. 29; No. 1; pp. 1-37 : Wiley on behalf of RAND Corporation; 0741-6261; Disponible en: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555814.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationLaffont, Jean-Jacques; Rey, Patrick; Tirole, Jean (1998) Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination. En: The RAND Journal of Economics. Vol. 29; No. 1; pp. 38-56 : Wiley on behalf of RAND Corporation; 0741-6261; Disponible en: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555815.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationLau, Charles Q; Lombaard, Ansie; Baker, Melissa; Eyerman, Joe; Thalji, Lisa (2019) How representative are SMS surveys in Africa? Experimental evidence from. En: International Journal of Public Opinion Research. Vol. 31; No. 2; pp. 309-330 : Oxford University Press;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationLoaiza, Rozzana; Barriga, Claudia (2014) Analisis del diferencial On-Net/Off-Net en el mercado de. : OSIPTEL; Disponible en: https://ideas.repec.org/p/opt/doctra/22.html.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationLópez, Ángel L; Rey, Patrick (2016) Foreclosing competition through high access charges and price. En: The Journal of Industrial Economics. Vol. 64; No. 3; pp. 436-465 : Wiley Online Library;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationRojas, Christian (2015) The welfare effects of banning off-net/on-net price differentials in the. En: Telecommunications Policy. Vol. 39; No. 7; pp. 590-607 : Elsevier;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationRojas, Christian (2017) How much is an incoming message worth? Estimating the call externality. En: Information Economics and Policy. Vol. 38; pp. 23-37 : Elsevier;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationSobolewski, Maciej; Czajkowski, Mikołaj (2018) Receiver benefits and strategic use of call externalities in mobile. En: Information Economics and Policy. Vol. 44; pp. 16-27 0167-6245;
dc.source.bibliographicCitationTdlc, (2012) Instrucciones de carácter general No. 2/2012. Disponible en: https://www.tdlc.cl/nuevo_tdlc/wp-content/uploads/instrucciones_generales/Instruccion_General_02_2012_Enmendado.pdf.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationTmg, Telecommunications Management Group (2016) Análisis de los mercados móviles de voz y de acceso a Internet en Colombia. : TMG; Disponible en: https://www.crcom.gov.co/recursos_user/2016/Actividades_regulatorias/merc_moviles/coment2/TMG_Analisis_de_los_mercados_moviles_06_10_16.pdf.
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.subject.jelD43, D62, L14es
dc.subject.keywordCalling circleses
dc.subject.keywordCall externalitieses
dc.subject.keywordNetwork competitiones
dc.subject.keywordPrice differentialses
dc.titlePrice discrimination under non-uniform calling circles and call externalitieses
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajospa
Bloque original
Mostrando1 - 3 de 3
221 B
Hypertext Markup Language
1.63 MB
Adobe Portable Document Format
12.18 KB
Unknown data format
Referencias bibliográficas