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Sanitation and Marriage Markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaign

dc.contributor.gruplacGrupo de investigaciones. Facultad de Economía. Universidad del Rosarioes
dc.creatorAugsburg, Britta
dc.creatorBaquero, Juan Pablo
dc.creatorGautam, Sanghmitra
dc.creatorRodríguez Lesmes, Paul Andrés
dc.descriptionEste documento analiza las decisiones matrimoniales de hombres y mujeres, enfocándose en el atractivo adicional del saneamiento dentro del arreglo de vivienda, en la India rural. Aprovechamos la variación de distrito y de tiempo de la Campaña de Saneamiento Total (TSC) que aumentó el saneamiento en un 6,6 por ciento entre los hogares con hijos elegibles para casarse y generó un aumento exógeno en la composición de los hogares con saneamiento. Utilizando datos de la Encuesta de Hogares de Desarrollo Humano de la India (IHDS) y el censo a nivel de distrito, mostramos que la exposición al CET aumentó la probabilidad de matrimonio de hombres y mujeres de hogares más pobres en 3.8 pp y 6.5 pp respectivamente. Las estimaciones en forma reducida incorporan tanto efectos de equilibrio general como efectos de programas heterogéneos, dos componentes importantes del comportamiento marital de equilibrio. Para descomponer el impacto general de la política en el equilibrio del mercado matrimonial, formulamos un modelo de emparejamiento simple en el que hombres y mujeres coinciden en características observadas y no observadas. A través de simulaciones de modelos, mostramos que las cohortes dentro de los mercados expuestos a TSC experimentaron un cambio en las ganancias conyugales tanto entre los partidos como dentro de un partido determinado. Específicamente, los patrones de clasificación resultantes muestran una marcada asimetría de género con un aumento en el excedente conyugal entre parejas donde los hombres son más ricos que su cónyuge, y una disminución en el excedente cuando la esposa es más rica. Además, el mayor acceso al saneamiento para las mujeres expuestas a TSC implicó una disminución en su control esperado sobre los recursos dentro del matrimonio.es
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses the marriage decisions of men and women, focusing on the added attractiveness of sanitation within the living arrangement, in rural India. We exploit district and time variation from the Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) which increased sanitation by 6.6 percent among households with marriage eligible children and generated an exogenous increase in the composition of households with sanitation. Using data from the Indian Human Development household survey (IHDS) and district level census, we show that exposure to TSC increased the probability of marriage for men and women, from poorer households, by 3.8 pp and 6.5 pp respectively. The reduced form estimates incorporate both general equilibrium effects and heterogeneous program effects – two important components of equilibrium marital behavior. To decompose the overall policy impact on marriage market equilibrium we formulate a simple matching model where men and women match on observed and unobserved characteristics. Through model simulations, we show that cohorts within TSC exposed markets experienced a shift in marital gains both across matches but also within a given match. Specifically, the resultant sorting patterns display a marked gender asymmetry with an increase in marital surplus among matches where men are wealthier than their spouse, and a decrease in surplus where the wife is wealthier. Moreover, the increased access to sanitation for TSC exposed women implied a decline in their expected control over resources within the marriage.es
dc.format.extent35 pp.es
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosario
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economía
dc.relation.ispartofDocumentos de trabajo economía, (2021); 35 pp.es
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)es
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dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.subjectEmparejamiento empíricoes
dc.subjectMercados matrimonialeses
dc.subject.ddcEconomía doméstica & vida familiares
dc.subject.keywordEmpirical matchinges
dc.subject.keywordMarriage marketses
dc.titleSanitation and Marriage Markets in India: Evidence from the Total Sanitation Campaignes
dc.title.TranslatedTitleMercados de saneamiento y matrimonio en la India: evidencia de la campaña de saneamiento totales
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