Ítem
Solo Metadatos

How is the trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk affected by genetic testing? Theory and experiment

Mostrar el registro sencillo de la publicación
dc.creatorBardey, Davidspa
dc.creatorDe Donder, Philippespa
dc.creatorMantilla Ribero, César Andrés
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-25T23:56:13Z
dc.date.available2020-05-25T23:56:13Z
dc.date.created2019spa
dc.description.abstractWe develop a theoretical analysis of two widely used regulations of genetic tests, Disclosure Duty and Consent Law, and we run an experiment in order to shed light on both the take-up rate of genetic testing and on the comparison of policyholders’ welfare under the two regulations. Disclosure duty forces individuals to reveal their test results to insurers, exposing them to a discrimination risk. Consent Law allows them to hide any detrimental information, resulting in adverse selection. The experiment results in much lower genetic tests take-up rates with Disclosure Duty than with Consent Law, showing that subjects are very sensitive to the discrimination risk. Under Consent Law, take-up rates increase with the adverse selection intensity. A decrease in the test cost, and in adverse selection intensity, both make it more likely that Consent Law is preferred to Disclosure Duty. © 2019 Elsevier B.V.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2019.102223
dc.identifier.issn1676296
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22363
dc.language.isoengspa
dc.publisherElsevier B.V.spa
dc.relation.citationTitleJournal of Health Economics
dc.relation.citationVolumeVol. 68
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Health Economics, ISSN:1676296, Vol.68,(2019)spa
dc.relation.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85072698328&doi=10.1016%2fj.jhealeco.2019.102223&partnerID=40&md5=749aa9fdbfa55ac4a8e4d3cb811093e1spa
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subject.keywordEthicsspa
dc.subject.keywordExperimentspa
dc.subject.keywordGeneticsspa
dc.subject.keywordHealth insurancespa
dc.subject.keywordLaw enforcementspa
dc.subject.keywordTheoretical studyspa
dc.subject.keywordTrade-offspa
dc.subject.keywordAdultspa
dc.subject.keywordArticlespa
dc.subject.keywordGenetic screeningspa
dc.subject.keywordGenetic susceptibilityspa
dc.subject.keywordHealth insurancespa
dc.subject.keywordPersonalized medicinespa
dc.subject.keywordWelfarespa
dc.subject.keywordConsent lawspa
dc.subject.keywordDisclosure dutyspa
dc.subject.keywordPersonalized medicinespa
dc.subject.keywordPooling health insurance contractsspa
dc.subject.keywordTest take-up ratespa
dc.titleHow is the trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk affected by genetic testing? Theory and experimentspa
dc.typearticleeng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spaArtículospa
Archivos
Colecciones
Artículos