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More public goods, more political reciprocity? Evidence from a post-conflict economy

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dc.contributor.advisorSeither Afonso, Julia
dc.contributor.advisorVargas Duque, Juan Fernando
dc.creatorGarzón Restrepo, Juan Esteban
dc.creator.degreeMagíster en Economía
dc.creator.degreeLevelMaestría
dc.creator.degreetypeFull time
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-11T20:47:59Z
dc.date.available2024-01-11T20:47:59Z
dc.date.created2023-12-14
dc.descriptionWhile a large literature defines and diagnoses the effects of weak institutions, much less is known about how to improve them. In developing countries, there are often many signs of weak institutions that undermine reciprocal behavior between the population and the state. This paper studies the effect of community-driven post-conflict development programs in Colombia (called PDET) on citizen's reciprocal behavior, especially tax compliance and participation in social mobilization. To the extent that PDET affects these outcomes, I document the extent to which these type of programs improve state capacity. Using a \textit{difference-in-differences} strategy, I compare municipalities with a close probability of being treated with treated ones to estimate causal effects. The results (due to data restrictions) show a short-term increase on protests fostered by weak institutions characteristics of the treated municipalities. On the other hand, tax revenue is influenced by an upsurge in property and sales taxes. This effect may be attributed to factors related to tax compliance, but it is not the sole plausible explanation. This provides evidence on how governments can generate new relationships on state capacity and tax compliance with historically harmful pasts societies.
dc.description.abstractWhile a large literature defines and diagnoses the effects of weak institutions, much less is known about how to improve them. In developing countries, there are often many signs of weak institutions that undermine reciprocal behavior between the population and the state. This paper studies the effect of community-driven post-conflict development programs in Colombia (called PDET) on citizen's reciprocal behavior, especially tax compliance and participation in social mobilization. To the extent that PDET affects these outcomes, I document the extent to which these type of programs improve state capacity. Using a \textit{difference-in-differences} strategy, I compare municipalities with a close probability of being treated with treated ones to estimate causal effects. The results (due to data restrictions) show a short-term increase on protests fostered by weak institutions characteristics of the treated municipalities. On the other hand, tax revenue is influenced by an upsurge in property and sales taxes. This effect may be attributed to factors related to tax compliance, but it is not the sole plausible explanation. This provides evidence on how governments can generate new relationships on state capacity and tax compliance with historically harmful pasts societies.
dc.format.extent38 pp
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_41974
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/41974
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosariospa
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economíaspa
dc.publisher.programMaestría en Economíaspa
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International*
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.subjectState capacity
dc.subjectIntrinsic reciprocity
dc.subjectPeace agreement
dc.subjectPublic goods
dc.subjectColombia
dc.subject.keywordState capacity
dc.subject.keywordIntrinsic reciprocity
dc.subject.keywordPeace agreement
dc.subject.keywordPublic goods
dc.subject.keywordColombia
dc.titleMore public goods, more political reciprocity? Evidence from a post-conflict economy
dc.title.TranslatedTitle¿Más bienes públicos, más reciprocidad política? Datos de una economía en situación de post-conflicto
dc.typebachelorThesis
dc.type.documentTrabajo de grado
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.type.spaTrabajo de grado
local.department.reportFacultad de Economía
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